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ABSTRACT

One of the most common and costly forms of deception and fraud online is phishing. Due to the ramifications of successful
phishing attacks, security experts and researchers seek to better understand this phenomenon. Prior phishing research has
addressed the “bait” and “hook” components of phishing attacks, the human-computer interaction that takes place as users
judge the veracity of phishing emails and websites, and the development of technologies that can aid users in identifying and
rejecting these attacks. Despite the extant research on this topic, phishing attacks continue to be successful as tactics evolve,
rendering existing research less relevant. Although numerous tools have been created to aid people in recognizing phishing
attacks, users disregard the recommendations of these tools. This paper summarizes the core of phishing research, provides
an update on trending attack methods, and proposes future research addressing computer credibility in a phishing context.
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ABSTRACT

Deception in computer-mediated communication is a widespread phenomenon. Cyber criminals are exploiting technological
mediums to communicate with potential targets as these channels reduce both the deception cues and the risk of detection
itself. A prevalent deception-based attack in computer-mediated communication is phishing. Prior phishing research has
addressed the “bait” and “hook” components of phishing attacks, the human-computer interaction that takes place as users
judge the veracity of phishing emails and websites, and the development of technologies that can aid users in identifying and
rejecting these attacks. Despite the extant research on this topic, phishing attacks continue to be successful as tactics evolve
rendering existing research less relevant, and users disregard the recommendations of automated phishing tools. This paper
summarizes the core of phishing research, provides an update on trending attack methods, and proposes future research
addressing computer credibility in a phishing context.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most prevalent and costly manifestations of deception in computer-mediated communication is phishing. Phishing
is “a form of social engineering in which an attacker, also known as a ‘phisher’, attempts to fraudulently retrieve legitimate
users’ confidential or sensitive credentials by mimicking electronic communications from a trustworthy or public
organization in an automated fashion.” The Anti-Phishing Working Group reported that the number of unique phishing
websites detected in the first quarter of 2010 was just fewer than 100,000, with the number of brands hijacked by phishing
campaigns around 800 . Furthermore, the financial losses associated with this form of attack have been estimated to be
between $400 million and $2.4 billion dollars . Due to the prevalence of phishing attacks, and their costly ramifications
when successful, security experts and researchers seek to better understand this phenomenon.
This attack methodology typically consists of three separate steps: creating a website that is designed to closely resemble a
legitimate site, uploading the spoofed site onto a webserver, and sending the attack email in large volumes in an attempt to
direct recipients to the spoofed site . Due to the two primary components (the email and the website) needed for a phishing
attack, phishing experts also refer to this approach as the bait and hook method . The deceptive email is referred to as the bait
as it is used to attract email recipients to the hook. The ability to identify a phishing email prior to visiting the corresponding
spoofed website is critical as 90% of users are unable to distinguish the difference between a legitimate website and a fake
website . In other words, if a user accepts a phishing email as being truthful, they are unlikely to identify deception in a
fictitious website. In total, 5% of targets will become a victim of the attack .
A significant portion of phishing research has addressed the identification and evaluation of various attributes commonly
found in attack emails . Furthermore, as reoccurring attributes are identified, automated tools have been developed to aid
users in identifying suspicious websites and emails cite needed. However, the effectiveness of these tools is questionable for
two reasons. First, the tactics utilized by phishers are constantly evolving , rendering the classification criteria for automated
tools less accurate over time. Second, the users of automated phishing tools often question the credibility of computer
assessments and disregard their recommendations. Consequently, additional research is needed to identify trending attack
methods currently utilized by phishers, and a new research stream is necessary to evaluate computer credibility in a phishing
context .
This paper has been organized into the following sections. First, literature is reviewed that addresses the behavioral and
technical elements of existing phishing research. Second, the methodology for collecting and analyzing a set of 2,700
phishing emails acquired from a Scamdex database is presented, and reoccurring attributes found in those emails are
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identified. Third, these attributes are compared with a prior linguistic analysis of phishing emails. Finally, a new stream of
phishing research is proposed.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing corpus of phishing research can be segmented into three core emphases: (1) identifying the attack methods
phishers employ in fraudulent emails and websites (2) understanding human-computer interaction with phishing emails and
websites, and (3) the development and implementation of anti-phishing technologies that aid humans in both identifying and
avoiding phishing attacks and emails. Relevant papers pertaining to each section are discussed in the following subsections.
Phishing Attack Methods

As identified earlier in this paper, phishing attacks are generally comprised of two components: the attack email (bait) and the
corresponding website (hook).
Research Addressing the “Bait”

The most important element of any phishing attack is the email, as recipients will first judge its veracity prior to being
directed to the corresponding fraudulent website. Table 1 identifies and classifies various tactics utilized in phishing emails to
deceive recipients into proceeding to the corresponding website. These tactics can be classified into technical and or social
engineering categories . Within the social engineering category, an email can have generic content (see Table 1) or it can be
content aware . A content-aware approach incorporates personalized information scraped from social networking sites thus
making the bait more credible to the recipient. Adding content-aware features to an email increase the success of phishing
emails from 5% to 72% .

Characteristics of Phishing Emails
Social Engineering Characteristics
E-mail Title

Technical Characteristics
Links to Web Sites That Gather Information

Urgency

Link Text in Email Differs from Link Destination

Impact

Using onMouseOver to Hide the Link

Company Name

Using the IP Address

E-mail Argument Quality

Using the @ Symbol to Confuse

General Content

Reply Address Differs From the Claimed Sender

Company’s Image

Hiding the Host Information

Links to a Real Company Site

Redirecting the URL

Email Appears to Be From Spoofed Company

Switching Ports

Response Action
Justification / Creating a Plausible Premise
Urgency
Security Promises
Collecting Information in the Email
Impact
Courtesy
Event
Penalty
Typos
Personalization
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Content-Aware Approach
Table 1 Components of Phishing Emails
Research Addressing the “Hook”

While the bait component of a phishing attack must be carefully crafted in order to deceive recipients, the corresponding
hook must utilize similar deceptive strategies for the attack to be successful. Well-crafted fraudulent sites have proven to be
very effective and fool from 83% to 90% of the individuals that view them . Table 2 identifies and classifies various tactics
utilized in phishing websites to build credibility and deceive targets into divulging their personal information. These tactics
can be classified into content-related and or technical categories .

Characteristics of Phishing Websites
Website Content

Technical Characteristics

Spoofed Content

SSL Certificates

Spoofed Layout

Browser Discrimination

Forms to Submit Information

Fake Address Bars

Pup-Up Windows

Disabling Right-Click

Information Processing

Visually Deceptive URL

Account Access Restrictions

Images Masking Underlying Text

Images Mimicking Windows
Windows Masking Underlying Windows
Table 2 Components of Phishing Websites
Research Addressing Human-Computer Interaction in a Phishing Context

A wide range of individual characteristics has been examined by researchers addressing the interaction between humans and
the attack methods phishers employ. The various individual characteristics relevant to phishing research can be classified as
either experiential or dispositional. Experiential factors include computer experience, web-purchasing experience, education
level, and Internet experience, which have proven to be ineffective in helping phishing targets distinguish between fraudulent
and legitimate websites . Additionally, the gender of targets has been found to be insignificant in predicting the ability of
targets to detect a phishing attack . Dispositional factors include sensitivity towards the value of information, concern for
privacy or security, obedience to instructions or authority, knowledge of institutional factors, and past experience with fraud,
all of which have been identified as contributors to the successful detection of deception in phishing emails . An examination
of the personality characteristics of deceived phishing targets found that experiential factors, rather than dispositional factors,
are most influential in individuals that successfully identify phishing attacks .
Anti-Phishing Technologies

As the variety and complexity of phishing attacks continue to evolve, researchers and security experts continue to develop
tools to aid users in the proper identification and avoidance of phishing emails and websites. The methods used to identify
suspicious sites range from machine-learning tools able to correctly classify 96% of phishing emails , to browser add-ons that
track user activity and present warnings when users are about to divulge personal information on untrusted sites . Examples
of other technologies that have been developed to thwart phishing attacks include: dynamic security skins using images to
verify that a website is legitimate , content-based tools used to identify phishing websites , password management tools , and
so forth.
While there is a significant number of tools that can be utilized to reduce the dangers of phishing, the most important aspect
of any technology is whether or not the end user actually uses it. A study addressing the effectiveness of three different
security toolbars found that users tend to consider the warnings they present as trivial as long as the website appears to be
legitimate . Users rationalized that their own knowledge and experience was sufficient to make the decision, and the security
toolbar was wrong in its recommendation. A different study found similar results as 68% of subjects asked to identify
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fraudulent websites disregarded warnings while 23% did not even look at security indicators in the web browser . In other
words, even technologies that are highly effective at distinguishing the difference between legitimate and fraudulent sites are
ineffective when users fail to heed their warnings.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To obtain a corpus of phishing emails, we scraped 2709 emails from Scamdex.com (“Email Scam, Internet Fraud, Identity
Theft & Phishing Resource,” n.d.). This corpus contained emails over a 3-year period from November 2006 to June 2009.
These emails were submitted to Scamdex by recipients of phishing attacks..
Initially, the emails were formatted for text analysis which was accomplished using the R Text Mining package (Hornik,
2008). Next, HTML tags were removed from the emails and punctuation characters and numbers were removed. We then
formatted the remaining text as lowercase characters and removed the stop words contained in the Standard English stop
word list in R. Finally, we stemmed the remaining words allowing only core words to be analyzed.
We then put the words into a Term Document Matrix using term frequency and inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) and
normalized the terms. This gave us a large list of terms occurring at least once in our corpus. Although we are trying to give a
detailed picture of current phishing practices, we also need to make sure that we are not reporting non-relevant categories.
Thus our next step was to only retain words that had at most a 90% sparsity (i.e. the words were only found less than 10% of
the documents were cut). This left us with 115 terms used in the phishing emails.
Our next step was to categorize the 115 terms into sensible categories. A similar categorization was done with emails from
2003 to 2005 . Wang et al. (2009a) ran an analysis on 210 phishing emails collected from the Anti-Phishing Working Group
using CATPAC. We solicited the help of three people to categorize the words. The only direction that these people were given
was to categorize the words and name the groups. They were not told the context or purpose of the categorization. After
obtaining the results, we grouped their categories into similar categories creating eleven categories to represent tactics that
phishers are using (see Table 3).
Politeness

Address, Apologize, Concern, Contact, Dear, Email, Feature, Inconvenience, Mail, Matter,
Message, Person, Please, Receive, Regards, Replies, Sent, Sincerely, Thank, User

How to do

Click, Choose, Detail, Internet, Link, Log, Login, Online, Page, Prompt, Restore, Review, Site,
System, Visit

What to do

Access, Confirm, Locate, Screen, Step, Verify

Story

Account, Additional, Bank, Card, Change, Record, Reserve, Server, Value

Customer Service

Answer, Assist, Attention, Customer, Experience, Help, Request, Service, Support, Understand

Fraud

Commit, Compromise, Failure, Fraud, Fraudulent, Unauthorized

Time

Active, Due, Future, Hour, Initial, Period, Recent, Regular, Soon, Temporarily, Time, Update

Purpose

Agreement, Attempt, Complete, Continue, Ensure, Follow, Maintain, Measure, Process,
Provide, Require, Use, Verification

Security

Copyright, Credit, Identity, Issue, Prevent, Protect, Right, Safe, Secure, Sensitive

Impact

Partial, Result, Suspend, Suspension

Notice

Alert, Department, Inform, Limit, Notice, Notify, Reason, Team, Unusual
Table 3 Phishing Tactics

When comparing our results to Wang et al. (2009), we found that there are several overlapping categories, and some new
categories. Wang et al. (2009a) identified seven groups which the authors titled as follows: Event, Impact, Justification,
Response Action, Penalty, Urgency, and Courtesy. Their Event and Impact categories coincide with our Story category; their
Justification to our Purpose; their Response action to our What To Do and How To Do; their Penalty to our Impact; their
Urgency to our Time; and their Courtesy to our Politeness. We also identified four new categories: Customer Service, Fraud,
Security, and Notice.
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Each email was then classified as either containing each tactic, or not. The evidence shows that these tactics are highly found
together with Fraud and Impact occurring at a lesser frequency (see Figure 1). This indicates that phishers are not informing
their targets of the consequences of their actions. This may be a successful strategy as people typically don’t understand the
consequences of phishing, and therefore are not telling them of the consequences may result in higher rates of success. It is
also interesting to note that there is a trend of decreasing frequencies of each tactic identified. There are two possible reasons
for this: 1) another tactic is emerging that is not a major player in our analysis or 2) phishers are starting to narrow the
number of tactics used (from a shotgun approach towards a sharpshooter approach).
Figure 1 also shows that Politeness is a fairly consistent tactic employed by Phishers. Politeness started out as the second
most popular tactic in 2006 tied with How to Do. By 2009, Politeness was the most popular tactic losing around 10%
frequency. Most other categories lost at least 20%.

Figure 1 Phishing Tactics Over Time
DISCUSSION

Based on these findings, an important direction for future research will be to identify methods by which anti-phishing
technology can be made more credible in the eyes of users. Significant research has addressed the issue of computer
credibility . Credibility, or believability, is a perceived quality commonly acknowledged to be composed of at least two
primary components: trustworthiness and expertise . When users interact with a website while using a phishing toolbar, the
toolbar may provide a recommendation against clicking a link or entering information based on certain cues present on the
site. The credibility of the toolbar application is critical in this situation because the system is providing advice. When the
computer is giving this type of advice or instruction, the user’s assessment of the application’s credibility will be a factor in
determining if the user follows the advice .
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Tseng and Fogg identify four primary types of computer credibility that could be useful in determining the best way to
improve the effectiveness of anti-phishing technology. The four types of credibility are presumed, reputed, surface, and
experienced. Presumed credibility is a pre-use level of credibility assigned to the technology. Research has been inconclusive
about the credibility people assign to computer technology in general, with some studies showing that computers are more
credible than humans , and others showing less . Additionally, as people gain more experience with computers, they realize
that they are not infallible, and recognize that they are programmed by humans and subject to human-like mistakes . Reputed
credibility is based on third party reports. For example, a computer program receiving good reviews from users would likely
be perceived as more credible than the same program receiving poor reviews.
The third type of credibility, and perhaps most important to phishing toolbars, is surface credibility. The design of a
program’s interface can have a significant impact on the credibility and usability . Different aspects of the interface are
important for different types of application . For example, privacy was important in building trust in website with high
information risk, while navigation was more important for website containing a lot of information to be processed. An
important direction for future research will be to determine the most critical components of design for anti-phishing
technologies, and incorporate those features into future iterations of the technology.
The final credibility type discussed by Tseng and Fogg is experienced credibility. The experienced credibility is developed
by a user over time while using a system. Experienced credibility is gained by providing correct recommendations or
information, and lost by providing incorrect information . When systems lose credibility by providing incorrect information,
the credibility can sometimes be regained by providing correct information again. However, the regained credibility may
never reach the same level as the initial credibility. This, of course, presumes that users continue to use a system. When users
lose faith in a system’s credibility, they may stop using it altogether .
While the issue of trustworthiness may be important, the users’ assessment of the toolbar’s expertise may be the most critical
factor. Often Internet users will dismiss recommendations from a phishing toolbar because they consider themselves web
savvy and think they know better . In a study of computer credibility, drivers were told to use a GPS-like path recommender
to find the optimal route to a given location . Drivers who were given a scenario in a familiar city were significantly less
likely to follow the recommendations than were drivers in an unfamiliar city. This phenomenon may partially explain why
users reject phishing toolbar recommendations. They consider themselves familiar with online territory, and are unsure of the
basis for the system’s recommendations, thus they ignore the advice of decision support systems. Interestingly, contradictory
evidence is presented in a study of users’ trust in spell-checking software . Even users who were high in verbal ability were
more likely to make grammatical or spelling errors when spell-checking software was turned on, indicating that they put
more trust in the computer’s recommendations than in their own ability. The underlying phenomenon explaining why users
would trust a computer system for a non-critical task like spell-checking, but fail to trust a system when attempting to protect
their personal information is an important area for future phishing research.
LIMITATIONS

Begin the limitations section here…
CONCLUSION

Phishers continue to be successful as their attack methods are constantly evolving and users frequently disregard the
recommendations provided by expert systems. The results of our empirical analysis support this claim as phishing tactics
identified in previous research have changed based on a more recent corpus of phishing emails. This research provides a basis
for automated-phishing tools to be calibrated; however, additional research is needed to understand why individuals are
willing to disregard expert systems when the privacy of their personal information is at stake.
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